Vietnam Redux

by James K. Sweeney
December 26, 2004

Our military is sacrosanct from serious criticism. Those on the ground, the riflemen, logistics people and the rest who comprise the operational military are beyond criticism. They do what they are told and they execute better than other military. There is another contingent of military: the strategists, the deep thinkers who analyze and decide how the field military is to function. Those elites have failed. Consider.

Pundits draw invidious comparisons between Viet Nam and Iraq. Frequently, their purpose was political: embarrass Bush; encourage Kerry; elect democrats. It failed because the purpose was transparent. Yet in the most important comparison between the two wars, analogies abound. For example, the enemy is not massed; he is not visible; he is lightly armed and mobile; he is indigenous thus needs little logistical support; he has no need for encampments, mess halls, air support or other indicia of the American military.

None of those enumerations is a surprise. They are easily inferred from the daily reports from Iraq. They are eerily familiar; they are Viet Nam redux.

A newly minted West Point career officer, circa 1968 - 1972, is today a colonel or a general. He is around 60 years old and has had years to hone his craft. He - and they - have failed. Those young shavetails, now senior officers, learned nothing about how to fight their Viet Nam war. That is why they are failing to win their Iraq war. They still fight the "big battalions" war last seen in 1945 Europe.

Our probable near-term enemies cannot fight those wars; they haven't sufficient personnel, they are ill-supplied, ill trained, lack military infrastructure, air power or supply capabilities. Unless and until we go to war with China, India or Russia, no other country has an old-fashioned army for us to fight. Nevertheless, the brass has failed to accept that premise. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has. It's the cornerstone of his light, mobile response military. Arrayed against him are the failed, old-time military who love "big": big armies, big wars, big budgets.

Our military's emphasis remains on the ground. While tactically sound, it's strategically dumb, having no hearts and minds component. Yes, we need to wipe out Hussein's remnants. Let the Marines take them out, street by street, one by one. Any suspect should be interrogated, and harshly. There's a war on and I believe in giving absolutely no quarter, none. The only good enemy is a dead enemy. On the other hand, where is the effort to win over the people, both in Iraq and home? Where are the programs designed to aid the Iraqi people who are not against us? Where are the programs designed to inform us at home as to what we are doing in addition to fighting?

It is that which is missing. Is it any wonder that Iraqis are unsure of our intentions? Is it any wonder that Americans have doubts about the Iraq War? As the military has failed so, have the politicians.

The president's rhetoric is short on our plan for Iraq other than holding elections. While no small thing, an election is but one in a series of milestones to bring Iraq to modernity. I know of no plan for Iraq. Until articulated, American actions will continue to generate doubt and confusion abroad and at home. The result in Iraq will be a longer conflict; among other nations, the lack of a plan sows confusion; at home, the philosophical division of Americans will continue.

 

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