The essence of the French-German plan is to wait and let Herr Blix’s inspectors “do their job”, particularly now that Hussein is actually destroying some old missiles. The Germans augment this by recommending the beefing up of the size of the inspection team from, roughly 200 to some 600 inspectors. This modest sized battalion of snoops would be on the ground, in Iraq. They would go everywhere, miss nothing, and, at some undetermined future point in time, report everything to Herr Blix. The new team’s information would then be presented by Herr Blix in yet another of his “on the one hand but then on the other hand” reports to the United Nations Security Council.

Of course, there are not yet 400 more inspectors. They must be recruited, then trained, then dispatched, then learn via some on the job training techniques, then do the job and then, ostensibly, report up the chain of command to Herr Blix. Time to achieve these goals? Sad to say, that minor detail is not in the Franco-German Plan. But surely it is counted in months, perhaps years. It is absolutely not counted in weeks. Other details omitted from the Franco-German Plan are:

there is no action specified as to what should be done should Hussein order the inspectors out of Iraq as he has done before;

there is no action specified should Herr Blix’s report candidly say Hussein has not disarmed which, by the by, is what 1441 requires: disarmament, total disarmament. 1441 is but resolution number 17 or 18, each in support of Iraq’s promises when it was defeated in the 1991 Gulf War.

One presumes the Security Council would recommend the involuntary disarmament of Hussein’s Iraq and the removal of Hussein from power. Unless, of course, at that point, there is a Russian Plan or a Chinese Plan proffered. Then, either of those could be tried. Eventually, Hussein will die of old age and there will be no war. Which is what our faithful ally and our recent friend desperately want. Washington is uncertain as to why our faithful ally and our recent friend want to maintain a dictator in power. It is rather tough to make a moral case for Hussein and few try. What’s left?

When first it leaked out, the French-German Plan’s flaws were obvious. For instance and most apparent, if 200 inspectors is too small a number, 600 is obviously a better number. But is it the right number? In square miles, Iraq is about the same as California. I know something about California as I live there; one could hide endless amounts of weaponry in California. A mere 600 inspectors would make but a dent in California’s land mass; it must be the same or similar in Iraq. So, perhaps 600 inspectors is also too few inspectors.

There is, however, a solution and one which, if applied, will surely get the job done while simultaneously averting war. Modestly, we call it the National Spectrum Deputy Plan. We propose an inspection team of about 200,000 men, one that is trained to follow orders, flexible in its task acceptance, logistically self-sustaining and presently available. This in-place team is the United States Army, Navy and Marine Corps already assembled and waiting to head into Iraq. George Bush, our Cowboy President, merely deputizes the forces of the United States to the U.N.’s Sheriff, probably Herr Blix, but definitely not to our faithful French ally, Dominique the Villain, and not to our recent German friend, Gerhard Schroeder. The troops are ordered not to fire a round except in self-defense and to simply march into Iraq from wherever they happen to be or wherever the closest U.N. allied country is. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, wherever.

It’s the perfect solution. Instant and complete inspection; all wrapped up in less than a month. The troops know better than most what a weapon looks like, thus they need little training; they know how to deal with them; they are disciplined; led by an officer corps; will not rampage or otherwise endanger the civilian population. The key to this is simple: we just don’t call them “troops”; we call them ‘deputy inspectors”. Some might deem this Orwellian; we prefer “Alice in Iraqiland”.

If anything goes wrong, say, for example, Hussein tries to kick the deputies out, or refuses to cooperate or tries to pull any of those myriad stunts for which he has become known, well, the troops know how to deal with that too. More importantly, Hussein knows that, thus is unlikely to pull such stunts.

The National Spectrum Deputy Plan has the merit of simplicity as well. It is easily understood by all for precisely what it is: an attempt to resolve with words that which we may otherwise be required to resolve by force. The lefties should love it as it averts war and leads to peace through palaver (a word Sheriffs and deputies always use as in: Let’s palaver with them thar’ bad guys Duke.) The righties will also love it as it shows the inherent value of the flexibility component of our Armed Forces and well-worth the $2.9 trillion cost to add that unique characteristic.