WINNERS & SINNERS

by: JAMES K. SWEENEY
December 14, 2006

THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP AND HOW TO WIN THE WAR IN IRAQ

There is much hand–wringing over Iraq, much of it valid. The litany is well-known and needs no repeating. The hand-wringers are heavy on the wringing but light on solutions except the Iraq Study Group (ISG). The ISG offered 79 (!)recommendations which it declared should be adopted in toto and without delay. None of that group has been elected to determine American military or foreign policy; none has any military leadership credentials. Its leader is beholden to the Saudi royal family with an anti-Israel history. Somehow, those facts tend to go hand-in-hand. That said, each is an accomplished person; none is a slouch; all are part of the Beltway Establishment or were in their heyday. Nevertheless, their report is, at best, a mediocre product of committee group-think. It is unworkable and designed as an insiders way out of the domestic political dilemma: how to explain original votes in favor of the war in Iraq with current positions of being against that war. Let Bush twist in the wind: it’s the rest of the Beltway for whom this “study” was composed. And remember, it’s that rest of the Beltway who will hire the study group members in the years to come.

The question of what to do in Iraq yet remains. It is useless to argue over whether we should be there or not: leave that to history. What to do is the question. There are three choices: Leave asap; stay without changing policy or stay but change policy. Were we to leave, which of our allies or friends would be able to count on us in the future? Taiwan? Israel? South Korea? We would simply move our now friends into the orbit of other, stronger-willed powers. Staying without change is plainly stupid; what we’re doing obviously needs to be done better, not necessarily faster, just better. That leaves us with the option of changing policy.

It’s been over 60 years since the United States has won a war. We did not win in Korea or Viet Nam and we are not winning in Iraq. Is there a discernible difference between the last war won and the wars lost? Yes, there is. That difference is the dedication to the destruction of those whom we declare to be the enemy. During World War II, we literally destroyed Germany and much of Japan. We obliterated cities, factories, shipyards, everything. Everybody in Germany, Japan or Italy was fair game. When these nations surrendered, it was on Roosevelt’s terms: “unconditional surrender” was the exact phrase used. We occupied those countries; we were completely in charge. That guiding principle is the basic mistake of the Iraq war. As Colin Powell said: You break it, you own it.” We need to act like we own it. If Fallujah objects and rises up, it must be destroyed, section by section, brick by brick. If anything moves, kill it. Pretty soon, nobody will make a wrong move. We are not in Iraq for the minds and hearts of Iraqis. We are there to kill terrorists and wipe out their supporters and supporting infrastructure, whether in Iraq per se or elsewhere. Kill them over there is preferable to killing them over here.

As to the minds and hearts of the rest of the world, that world will understand. It’s widely reported that few love us now so a change in policy isn’t going to increase the number who dislike us. It also matters little what people and the press publicly say but, if it does, what do you think they will say if we simply bail, leaving the Iraqis to the tender mercies of Iran, Syria and opposing Iraqi factions?

The other policy change we should make is to stop trying to make Iraq that which it is not: one nation, indivisible, under Allah, with liberty and justice for all. Iraq has never been a willing nation. It has always been a construct of others. There is, however, the Kurdish North which can and should be made into Kurdistan with American protection from Turkey. That serves as a reminder that denying the U.S. flyover rights, as our alleged ally Turkey did in the early part of this war, comes at an eventual price. The Kurds can make their own country with nominal help from us plus they will be an American ally of the type we want.

The Shia-Sunni question can then be faced at some calm and with some equanimity. We run the country; we set the time-table; we set the rules such as equal rights for all, including women; low-level, local elections after some time, in short, nation-building. Use our occupation of Japan as a model. It worked there and it will work in Iraq.

There is no other way.